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Summary findings
Using historical data on sovereign and individual  sovereign downgrading would bring greater changes in
borrowers, Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni assess the potential  capital allocations than an upgrading, and would call for
impact on non-high-income countries of linking capital  larger capital requirements at the very time access  to
asset requirements for banks to private sector ratings, as  capital markets was more difficult.
the Basel Committee has proposed.  Under the new guidelines, capital requirements in
They show that linking banks' capital asset  developing countries would thus be exposed to the
requirements to external ratings would have undesirable  cyclical swings associated with the revision of sovereign
effects for developing countries.  ratings in recent crises.
First, ratings of banks and corporations in developing  Ultimately, linking banks' capital asset requirements to
countries are less common, so capital asset requirements  private sector ratings would reduce the credit available to
would be practically insensitive to improvements in the  non-high-income countries and make it more costly,
quality of assets  - widening the gap between banks of  limiting economic activity. Bank capital needs in
equal financial strength in higher- and lower-income  developing countries would be more volatile than those
countries.  in high-income countries.
Second, bank and corporate ratings in developing  These findings suggest that the Basel Committee
countries (unlike their counterparts in high-income  should reassess  the role it proposes assigning to external
countries) are strongly linked to the sovereign ratings for  ratings, to minimize the detrimental impact of the
the country - and appear to be strongly related  regulatory use of such ratings on developing countries.
(asymmetrically)  to changes in the sovereign ratings. A
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Introduction
The release for public comments in June  1999 of  the new Basel Committee
proposal on bank Capital Asset Requirements (CARs) has ignited a lively discussion on
whether and how the orientation taken by the Committee should be revised. Part of the
criticism questions the role that the proposal assigns to  external ratings. Specifically,
according to the proposal, CARs on assets vis-a-vis high-rated agents would be much
lower than CARs on assets vis-a-vis low-rated and non-rated agents. This would be a
desirable step towards enhancing bank  efficiency in allocating loans if  credit ratings
displayed a homogeneous quality across markets and borrowers. Unfortunately, whereas
credit rating  agencies  have  a  longer  record in  assessing the  health  of  banks  and
corporations in the USA  and some other developed countries, their experience with
sovereign  and private sector ratings in NIHICs'  is often limited to the last decade, which is
likely to affect the quality of ratings. 2
In this paper we provide evidence that linking bank CARs to  external ratings
would,  from the  perspective of  less developed financial systems, introduce modest
improvements at  the  cost  of  substantial  distortions.  Volatility  of  banks'  capital
requirements in poorer countries would be increased and the cost of capital for the best
institutions of those  countries would be higher than for peer institutions from more
developed economies. In turn, this would negatively affect the availability and cost of
credit in NHICs. The damage would stem from three distinct effects.  The first effect is
mundane in nature: as ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in
NHICs, bank CARs would not decrease (or increase) in these countries according to the
risk exposure of individual corporations, as opposed to what would happen for high-
income countries (HICs). The second effect stems  from the  fact that,  based on the
historical experience, NHICs have experienced downgradings of their sovereign ratings
which a number of recent studies have labeled as "excessive".  3 Since the sovereign rating
is generally  the pivot of all the other country's ratings -determining defacto a ceiling for
the private sector- this entails a generalized negative impact on the country's bank CARs.
The third effect depends on the fact that bank and corporate ratings in NHICs are more
tightly linked to sovereign rating changes, introducing an element of asymmetry between
the treatment of bank CARs in HICs and NHICs.
From these perspective, our findings suggest a reassessment of the role assigned
to external ratings in the new Basel Committee proposal, with a view to minimizing the
detrimental impact that the regulatory use of external ratings could have for NHICs. A
modest reassessment could be to grant banks a time frame to phase-in the new rules long
enough to allow for a substantial increase in the number of rated banks and corporations
1 Non-high-income countries include high middle-income, middle-income, and low-income countries as
categorized  by the World  Bank.
2 IMF (1999) provides an extensive discussion of a) the problems faced in assessing the accuracy of ratings
in developing economies; b) the changes in the analytical methodology used by credit rating agencies
during the recent crises.
3See  among others, Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) and Monfort and Mulder (2000). See Cantor and Packer
(1994, 1996) for early analyses of rating agencies' behavior.  See also Kuhner (1999) and Partnoy (1999)
for additional  critical discussion  of rating agencies' assessments.
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located in developing countries and to  allow time for rating agencies to stabilize the
quality of their assessments. A more radical step would be to abandon altogether, for the
time being, external ratings as determinants of bank CARs in NHICs. An intermediate
revision would be to recognize that ratings cannot be considered a "sufficient" statistic
for assessing the quality of sovereign and corporate borrowers in countries which lack
transparent institutional setting as it is the case for most NHICs. 4 In these cases they
should therefore be integrated by additional sources of information in order to prevent
regulatory induced distortions.
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the geographical
distribution of sovereign and private ratings throughout the globe.  This substantiates the
claim that private sector ratings are heavily concentrated in  (some) HICs.  Using the
geographical  distribution of private sector ratings and their levels, Section 3 simulates the
impact of the new proposed regulation  on bank CARs in different countries. In Section 4,
we provide some descriptive evidence of the asymmetric impact of ratings in East Asian
crisis countries, in the aftermnath  of the crisis.  Following the economic recovery in 1999,
sovereign ratings were promptly brought back to investment-grade, while the revision of
corporate ratings has been considerably more conservative. More systematically, the
econometric analysis in Section 5 contrasts the experience of corporate ratings in HICs
and  NHICs, providing an  empirical measure of  the higher  sensitivity to  sovereign
downgrading displayed by banks and non bank corporates in NHICs.  In  Section 6,
drawing on the previous results, we offer some illustrative examples of how the proposed
revision of the capital accord could have affected bank capital requirements for those
NHICs which have suffered a sovereign downgrading. Section 7 concludes stressing the
policy implications of our findings.
2. The geographical  distribution of ratings
The geographical coverage of rated firns  has greatly increased in the last two
decades together with the progressive globalization of goods and financial markets. This
development is the consequence of both the greater scope of  coverage of the larger
international rating agencies (S&P, Moody's, Fitch-IBCA) and of a more active presence
of nationally  based rating agencies.
In this paper we shall focus on the role of international rating agencies, whose
assessments are more easily comparable on a homogeneous basis and which provide a
more transparent -if  not exclusive- benchmark for regulatory purposes. An exam-ple  of
the development in  the scope of  coverage by  large international rating  agencies is
provided by the increase in the number of foreign currency sovereign ratings provided by
Standard and Poors, which has gone from only 11 countries twenty years ago to 25 in
1989 and to 80 in 1999. The expansion of the number of rated firms has followed that of
the sovereign  ratings. At the end of 1999, only 6 countries, among those who had an S&P
sovereign  rating, did not have any individual firm rating.
4 The interpretation of bank ratings as a sufficient statistics is supported by the following excerpts from
Moody's (1999a, p.9): "Paraphrasing Friedrich von Hayek, who famously saw the beauty of the market in
the fact that it assinmilates  information by reducing it to a single price, we can suggest that the beauty of a
rating is that it assimilates  credit information  and analysis into a symbol.".
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The number of rated firms per country, computed as the average number of firms
who held a foreign or domestic currency rating from S&P and Moody's  in the second
half of 1999, shows that the scope of coverage for banks is substantially similar to that of
the total of rated firms. In both cases Africa, Central America, Central Asia and the
Middle East show the lowest density of coverage. Most developing countries show the
lowest  degree  of  concentration  of  rated  firms,  exception  made  for  fast  growing
economies as Korea and Indonesia and for large countries as China, Brazil, Argentina
and Chile.
In what  follows, we  conventionally convert the equivalent Moody's  and  S&P
alphanumeric rating scale into the numeric scale as reported in Table 1.
The  progressive  extension of  the  rating  coverage  also  seems  to  be  closely
associated with the level of economic development and the rate of economic growth. Are
the number of rated firms and the level of their ratings positively associated with their
country's income level?  In order to shed some light on this issue, we have grouped the
countries with at least one rated firm in four categories according to their income level:
GIO countries, High income non-GIO countries, Upper-middle income countries and
Low-middle income countries. Table 2 shows the number of rated institutions-banks
and non-banking firms alike-and  the median rating for each of the four categories as
reported by  S&P. It  appears that the total number of rated firms declines sharply in
countries of low income. The reduction of rated firms is particularly steep when it comes
to non-banks. The number of rated firms in G10 countries is 24 times higher than that of
firms located in the lowest income group, as opposed to a GDP level eight times larger.
The number of rated banks is instead only five times larger. The median rating of the four
categories shows that the first two groups of high-income countries (GIO and non-G10)
are solidly positioned above the level  of investment grade (55 in the numeric scale),
while both the middle and lower income groups are below the level of investment grade.
An analogous situation can be found for non-banks as well. Though the values of median
ratings do not exhibit a decreasing, monotonic pattern, they are generally lower for firms
in NHICs than for firms in high-income countries. This finding will be explored in more
detail in the next sections of the paper.
Are firms' ratings closely associated with sovereign ratings? What is the role of
income levels in this relationship? Figure 1, which plots the distribution of sovereign and
firms' ratings for the four income groups of countries previously defined, sheds some
light on these two questions. The correlation between firms'  and  sovereign ratings is
almost non-existent for G10 countries.  However, it becomes increasingly tighter for the
other three  groups  of  countries as  the  income  level  decreases.  Furthermore, GI0
countries display a very clear bimodal distribution of firms'  ratings, as a result of two
different distributions for firms in the banking sector and outside the banking sector: the
former group of firms displays a maximum below the investment grade level while the
latter group is much more concentrated towards higher ratings. In contrast, the behavior
of the three remaining groups of countries demonstrates that there is a closer correlation
between firms' and sovereign ratings, that ratings for both banks and non-banks exhibit a
similar pattern and that average ratings decrease with the level of income.
Overall, this brief overview of the worldwide distribution of sovereign and firm
ratings shows that US based rating agencies, in spite of the very rapid growth of their
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international activities in the last decade, have devoted most of their efforts to relatively
more developed economies, where marginal and fixed costs associated to the coverage of
additional firms are lower and/or where the demand for ratings is higher. Second, the
attainment of a worldwide scope of coverage is a very recent phenomenon, providing
rating  agencies with  too  limited a  sample  for comprehensive assessments of  their
accuracy in non-GI0 countries. Third, rating agencies tend to concentrate initially on the
banking sector and only subsequently move to the non-bank sector of the economy.
Finally,  firms'  ratings  follow more  closely  sovereign ratings  as  the  income  level
decreases. While these outcomes may be fully consistent with rational assessments of
credit risk in economies with large information  costs and unstable institutional structures,
they also point to potential shortcomings  in the use of ratings for regulatory purposes. In
the Sections below, we  shall try  to  characterize with  greater detail  some  of these
shortcomings  and to assess their implication  on the design of bank capital regulation.
3. From the distribution  of ratings to that of capital requirements
As reported in Table 3, the rule relating higher capital requirements to lower
rating categories is  not a monotone one and  differs for banks and non-banks.  The
distribution of capital requirements,  which is implicit in the Basel proposal, is therefore
not an obvious outcome of the distribution of ratings, which we have just reviewed.  In
order  to  derive the  distribution of  changes in  capital requirements implied in  the
transition from the present system to the proposed one, we have simulated the effect on
the regulatory capital of a bank which would lend to the rated firms located in any single
country.  The exercise-based  on the ratings provided by S&P-simulates  the capital
requirements that banks would have faced, had  the proposed revision of the Capital
Accord come into force in the month of November 1999. We then compare the outcome
of the simulation with the current capital requirements as defined by the 1988 Capital
Accord.
The 1988 regulation imposed different capital requirements according to: 1) the
nature of the borrower-bank  versus non-bank; 2) the location of the borrower-OECD
vs. non-OECD country; 3) the maturity of the loan-less  than or more than one year. To
compare the 1988 regulation with the new Basel proposal effectively, we focus on the
differential impact of the proposed new regulation according to the geographical location
of the borrower, its economic sector (bank versus non-bank), and the maturity of loans.
Figure 2A shows the dlifferential  capital requirements for all the rated non-bank
corporations located in the four previously described groups of countries. Given the
nature of the current regulation,  which defines a specific regulatory treatment for OECD
countries, we have modified the composition of the first two groups along the partition of
OECD vs.non-OECD countries  instead of that Gl0 vs.non-G10 countries.
For non-bank corporations, which start all from an 8 per cent requirement, there
are three possible outcomes: a. decrease of 6.4 percentage points, no change, an increase
of 4 percentage points. In our sample, the number of high rated corporations (better than
AA), which will allow a lower capital requirement and will accordingly  face a lower cost
of bank credit, is equal to 581 OECD based firms and to only 15 non-OECD based firms,
located in the high income category.  Accordingly, no firm belonging to the two lower
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income categories would experience a reduction in its borrowing costs.  Among OECD
based corporations, about four fifths would see no change in the capital banks have to set
aside against loans  to  them.  The  same is  true  for  the vast  majority of  the  two
intermediate groups of countries. However, more than one third of rated firms located in
the lower income category would instead face a steep increase.  As a result, the average
increase of capital that banks would be required to set aside for lending to an OECD
corporation would be reduced by I percentage point while that required for lending to a
corporation based in the poorer group of countries would increase by  1.5 percentage
points. This average level, though, may hide the marginal impact on different groups of
borrowers (Figure  2A, section  b).  Differential capital requirements associated with
different ratings may reach 10.4 percentage points, with potentially relevant effect on the
direction of bank capital flows.
Regarding banks we use a base reference of a common capital requirement of 1.6
per cent on all loans made to other banks, following the notion that foreign borrowing of
non-OECD  banks from OECD banks has mostly been concentrated in the short end of the
maturity spectrum. As for the newly proposed rules, we have concentrated on the case in
which bank capital weights are referred to individual bank ratings (option 2 of the Basel
Consultative paper) and not to the sovereign rating of the country where the bank is
incorporated (option 1 of the Consultative paper).  The differential impact of the two
options is very limited and does not add new elements to our exercise.
Given these assumptions, the new rules would imply that, differently from the
non-bank case, four possible outcomes could prevail: no change, increases of 2.4, 6.4,
and 10.4 percentage points. The median value of the increase in capital requirements for
loans to OECD banks is equal to 2.4 percentage points, while that for loans to non-OECD
banks is equal to 6.4 percentage points. On average, capital requirements would increase
by 2 percentage points for OECD banks and up to more than 6 percentage points for
banks of poorer countries (Figure 2B, section  b).  For the sake of completeness,  we report
also the impact on average capital requirements of long-term lending to  non-OECD
banks, which was assigned an 8 per cent weight in the 1988 Accord.  Even in this case,
lending to lower income countries' banks would imply increased capital requirements.
As  for non-banks, foreign controlled subsidiaries of  highly  rated  firms, which  are
assigned the rating of their holding company or can borrow from it, might face capital
requirements on their borrowing which could differ up to  10.4 percentage points from
those of domestic banks.
Of course the increase in capital requirements  discussed so far would give rise to
an equivalent demand for new capital only in the case in which national regulations were
fully aligned to  the  1988 Capital Accord  and  did  not  already  incorporate stricter
requirements. From this perspective, our  estimates could be  seen as a  ceiling to the
amount of new capital required. At the same time, it could be  argued that national
requirements may very well be revised upward in order to maintain a more restrictive
stance at the national level.
Although it impossible to assess the welfare implications of the external rating
procedure for defining minimum bank capital ratios without incorporating additional
elements into the analysis, we can already see that less developed economies are likely to
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suffer from a substantial increase in their borrowing cost. 5 Even in the case in which this
increase is generated by  the desirable removal of previous subsidization schemes, it
appears important to  devote  particular  attention to  the  phasing-in process  of  any
regulatory change in the domrain  of minimum  bank capital ratios. Such caution is needed
in  order to  avoid undesired systemic implications, which could increase rather than
reduce the fragility of banking systems.
More generally, all other things being equal, any risk-related criterion for the
definition of minimum capital ratios would substantially decrease the cost of credit for
internationally diversified fitms and could result in an increase in the share of credit to
the  domestic  sector  provided  by  internationally  diversified  firms.  Although  the
equilibrium  allocation  should  arguably  benefit  from  the  removal  of  an  implicit
subsidization scheme to the riskiest firms in the market, the potential consequences of a
large reallocation of credit flows among different categories of financial interrnediaries
would need to be analyzed carefully.
4. A tale from the 1997-98 crises: downgrading  sovereigns, banks and corporations
The experience of soviereign  and private sector ratings in emerging economies in
1997-98 may provide an example in which the revision of ratings could have had some
undesired macroeconomic consequences had it been related to banks minimum capital
requirements. Indeed, the  East Asian  crisis  and  the other  crises  that  hit  emerging
economies  during 1997-98  induced markets and rating agencies to a delayed and large set
of revisions of their assessment on crisis countries. Ratings were sharply downgraded for
sovereigns. The astounding downgrading is depicted in the rating-transition Figure 3.
Based on Moody's data for a. large set of countries, 6 Figure 3 reports on the x axis 1996
(pre-crisis) sovereign ratings and on the y  axis the relative  1998 (peak-of-the-crisis)
ratings. The rating-transition graph can be read as follows.  Figure 3 is divided into
different regions by three lines: the 450  continuous line contrasts 1996 with 1998 ratings;
the vertical dotted line separates below-investment-grade  from above-investment-grade
ratings for 1996; the horizontal dotted line separates  below-investment-grade  from above-
investment-grade ratings  for  1998.  Points lying below  the  450 line  identify those
countries suffering a downgrading between 1996 and 1998; points lying on the 450 line
refer to those countries whose rating did not change; points above the 450 line identify
those  countries whose rating  improved between  1996 and  1998.  In  addition,  the
horizontal and vertical dotted lines divide the graph into four quadrants.  Points in the
Northwest quadrant identify countries holding above-investment-grade ratings in both
1996 and  1998.  Points in  the Southeast quadrant identify countries holding below-
investment-grade ratings in both  1996 and  1998.  Points in the  Southwest quadrant
' The limited number of rated firms in NHICs and the fact that those firms are likely to have easier access
to non-bank sources of financing does not weaken our conclusions.  Bank regulators, in fact, will not put at
a disadvantage rated finns, which are likely to have lower risk profiles. They, instead, are expected to
extend the higher capital requirements of rated firms to non-rated concerns  as well.
6 Specifically, for each of the two years, we consider the year-minimum sovereign rating for the following
31 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Singapore,  Sweden, Switzerland,  Thailand, UK, USA, Venezuela.
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identify countries holding above-investment-grade ratings in  1996 and  switching to
below-investment-grade  in  1998.  Points in the Northeast quadrant identify countries
holding below-investment-grade ratings in  1996 and switching to  above-investment-
grade in 1998.
The distinction between above-investment-grade  and below-investment-grade  (or
speculative-grade)  ratings is very important: besides affecting the cost at which issuers
can borrow, ratings determine also the amount of the supply of funds. Specifically,
statutes and regulations often forbid institutional investors to  invest in assets carrying
ratings below a certain level (Dale and Thomas, 1991): these assets are referred to as
"below-investment-grade"  or "speculative" assets. Thus, when an issuer receives a rating
below-investment-grade, the  number of  potential investors  significantly shrinks. In
practice, such issuer will no longer face the demand from all  investors. If the legal
restriction becomes binding for institutional investors, our below-investmnent-grade  issuer
will have to rely only on the small fraction of investors to which such restriction does not
apply.
A few facts stand out clear from Figure 3.  Besides the downgradings of Brazil
and Venezuela (in Latin America) and that of India, the sharpest downgradings affected
the East Asian crisis countries: Indonesia, Korea and Thailand fell below investment
grade and Malaysia came close to the threshold. Various papers have claimed that rating
agencies  behaved  procyclically, 7 downgrading  these  countries'  sovereign  ratings
excessively  with respect to their underlying fundamentals.
Downgradings  were extensive not only for sovereigns but they amply affected the
respective banking systems.  This was an outcome to be expected if one considers that
currency and banking crises tend to coincide in emerging economies (Kaminsky and
Reinarth, 1999).  However, the extent to which bank ratings dropped is astounding: the
bank rating-transition Figure 4 shows this.  Specifically, the dramatic fall brought below
investment grade ratings for Korea, Malaysia and Thailand and worsened greatly those
for Indonesia as well. 8
It was perhaps less easy to predict that (non-bank) corporate ratings would be
severely downgraded as well.  Yet, this is the evidence we gather from the non-bank
rating-transition  Figure 5.9 Corporate downgradings  were sharpest in Indonesia,  but they
were sufficient to bring the average corporation below-investment-grade also in Korea
and in Thailand.
Finally, it is worth noticing that sovereign  ratings did show some upward revision
in  1999, as  soon as  recovery started  for  East Asian crisis  countries (Figure  6A),
consistently with the hypothesis that the 1997-98 downgradings were excessive.  This,
however, did not translate equally rapidly in a relief for these countries' corporations
(Figure  6B).  Both  the  Korean  and  Thai  sovereign ratings were  brought  back  to
7 See, among the others, Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999); Monfort, and Mulder (2000).
8  Specifically, for each of the two years, we consider the year-minimum average-bank rating for the
following 15 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore,  Sweden, Thailand.
9 Specifically,  for each of the two years, we consider the year-minimnum  average-non-bank  rating for the 31
countries included in Figure 3.
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investment grade in 1999, but this did not materialize as quickly for Korean and Thai
corporations.
The main messages we derive from the descriptive evidence we just showed are
that, in emerging economies, private sector ratings seem to greatly depend on the pattern
of sovereign ratings.  To the extent that sovereign ratings are procyclical, this directly
entails that perverse swings in the cost of capital to the private sector will be amplified.
This will be even more so should ratings be built into bank CARs, according to the new
Basel proposal.  Drawing these conclusions on the basis of descriptive analysis only is
however improper. It is now time to turn to the econometric  analysis to ascertain  whether
and to what extent private sector ratings show excess sensitivity to sovereign ratings in
emerging economies.
5. The pattern of sovereign and individual ratings
We adopt an error correction model (ECM) in the spirit of Harvey (1981) and
Hendry (1995). The error correction specification of the model allows us to capture not
only the short-term dynamics of the relationship between private sector and sovereign
ratings but also the long-term structure of such relation. The model that we estimate has
the following  specification:
1)  ARatingi,  = a +,/3AStvRatingi,  + yRatingi  t-l  + SSovRatingi,,t- + Dummies+  ei,
where  Rating i, is the private rating of firm i at time t; SovRatingi;, is the sovereign rating
in firm i's country at time t, a is the constant term, 131<1  and £  is the error term. Changes
in the variables are indicated by A. The coefficient of the long-terrn relationship is given
by -6 1y. The short-term (or immediate) impact of the sovereign rating on the individual
firm rating is ,B.  In order to investigate the impact of sovereign up- and down-grading on
individual firms in particular groups of countries, we also include a dummy for HICs.
Other dummies include industry dummies.
The  econometric approach we  follow  consists of  estimating two  panels  of
individual firm ratings-referred  respectively as banks and non-banks--by  examining
their dependence on their countries' sovereign ratings over the period I 990-99.i1  The
reason we opt to keep the bank ratings separate from the non-bank ratings has to do with
the special role banking systems have come to play in emerging economies' crises.
Namely,  as  stressed  by  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1999), in  emerging  economies,
currency/balance of payments and banking crises tend to be "twin crises", in the sense
that  a  banking  crisis  may  trigger  a  currency  crisis  and  vice-versa.  Accordingly,
particularly in the case of downgradings, we  may well expect a  strong relationship
between sovereign and bank ratings, whereas, a priori, we should be agnostic on whether
there is a strong link between sovereign and non-bank ratings. Several motivations for a
close relationship between individual banks and sovereign ratings are also described in
1°  The linear rule used to attribute numerical  equivalents  to ratings is likely to underestimate  the strength of
the relationship between rating changes at lower levels of ratings. An alternative non linear rule, based on
the level of credit spreads associated to different levels of ratings, would highlight a stronger correlation
between sovereign and non sovereign  rating changes in NHICs, thus strengthening our findings.
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Moody's  (1999a,  1999b) methodology  for  assessing bank  credit  risk  in  emerging
markets.  "  l
The two panels are unbalanced because not all firms have a rating for each year.
The ratings we use are those attributed by Moody's.  The basic statistics of the two panels
are reported in Table 4.  For each year, we attribute to each firm the minimum rating held
during that year.  In addition, in order to  ascertain whether the hypothesized excess
sensitivity of emerging economies' private sector ratings to changes in sovereign ratings
is  asymmetric, we  dichotomize  firm rating  changes into  positive  (upgradings)  and
negative (downgradings). Our a priori is that the excess sensitivity might be stronger for
negative than for positive changes.
5.1  The case of non-bank corporations
The non-bank corporation panel  contains observations referring to  980 rated
firms-rated  in one or more years over 1990-99-from  40 countries.2  Tables 4 and 5
describe the composition of the sample in 1999, when we observe a rating for 895 of the
980 firms.  Country-wise, 84.5 per cent of the firmns  are based in high-income countries.
Sector-wise, approximately one third of the firms are utilities (oil;  electric; telecom;
water).  The median rating is substantially higher in high-income countries (65 against
40); in low-income countries median firn ratings are closer to their respective sovereign
ratings (40 to 52.5 against 65 to 100 for high-income countries). Median firm ratings are
higher for most utilities and automotive firms; they are lower  for firms in the metal
industry and in the service sector.
Table 6 reports the results of five different specifications of the panel regression. 13
The first specification is the base one. Results show that non-bank ratings for firm i at
time t are negatively related to rating changes for firm i at time t-1 (RATING(T-1)) and
are strongly positively related to sovereign rating changes at time t (ASOVEREIGN). 14
i  The relationship  between  sovereign  ratings  and  ratings  on domestic  denominated  instruments  should  be
looser  than that for foreign  currency  denominated  instruments  (Moody's,  1999). No relationship  should
instead exist between Moody's Financial  Strength  Ratings -assessing  the firm's stand-alone  financial
strength  - and sovereign  ratings.  Our empirical  analysis  will  be devoted  to assess  the relationship  between
sovereign  ratings  and  ratings  on long  term  bank deposits  and  debt  issues  of non-bank  corporations.
12 Specifically,  we consider  the year-minimum  sovereign  rating  for:  Argentina,  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,
Brazil,  Canada,  Chile, China, Colombia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, Germany,  Greece
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, UK, USA, Venezuela.
13 All the regressions are run by OLS with random effects using RATS.  The 18 dummies controlling for
sector effects are not reported for convenience:  they are generally not significant and omitting them doesn't
qualitatively alter regression results.  The fourth and fifth columns report the  same specification as the
second and third columns, respectively, the only change being that the specific effect is singled out for
HICs instead than for NHICs.
14 We must point out that SOVEREIGN(T-1)  is non-significant in the non-bank panel.  This suggests that,
in our sample, we cannot identify a long-term relation between firm and  sovereign ratings, although a
short-term relation is still identified.  As we will see below, this contrasts with what we find for the bank
panel.  Although we don't have a fully satisfactory explanation for this lack of a long-term relation between
firm and sovereign ratings, we detect that the paucity of observations  for NHICs' firms is more pronounced
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Furthermore,  the  negative  and  significant  coefficient  of  the  dummy  for  NHICs
(NONHINCM DUMMY) suggests that rating changes are generally smaller in size in
these countries. Nevertheless, since these countries' rating levels are lower than for high-
income countries, smaller-sized rating changes may still be larger in relative terms for
non-high-income  countries (NHICs).
The second specification adds the new variable NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN,  in
order to  check whether sensitivity to sovereign rating changes is  larger for firms in
NHICs. Results strongly support our priors: ASOVEREIGN  is no longer significant while
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  is significant and its positive coefficient is larger in size
than the coefficient for ASOVEREIGN  in the first specification (0.50 against 0.45).  We
interpret this as evidence that non-bank rating changes are sensitive to sovereign rating
changes in NHICs but not in high-income countries.
The  third  specification  includes  the  additional  variable
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOWNSOV,  i.e. the variable singling out only sovereign
downgradings for NHICs. 15 This is meant to check whether firm ratings in NHICs are
more sensitive to  sovereign downgradings than to sovereign upgradings.  Results are
quite telling.  On the one hand, NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  becomes almost non-
significant, its sign changes, and its coefficient shrinks (-0.14 in lieu of 0.50).  On the
other hand, NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOWNSOV  is significant and its coefficient
is even larger than the one for NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  in the second specification
(0.83 against 0.50).  The  fact that the R2 sizably increases indicates that this  final
specification improves on the previous one. This suggests that the excess sensitivity to
sovereign  rating  changes  is  ample  but  it  is  by  and  large  limited  to  sovereign
downgradings  in  NHICs.  In  practice,  a  10-point--or  two  notches-sovereign
downgrading translates into a 6.9 point downgrading for NHICs'  firms whereas it does
not systematically affect non-bank ratings in high-income countries.
Finally, the specification of equations (2) and (3) are replicated for HICs. Their
estimation shows the absence of short and long term relationships between sovereign and
private sector ratings both in the upgrading and in the downgrading episodes.
in the non-bank  panel than in the bank panel.  This possibly  precludes  identification  of the long-term
relation  in the non-bank  panel.
15  To be sure,  in our sample,  most downgradings  refer  to NHICs.  However,  there are also  downgradings  for
HICs:  e.g. Canada  was downgraded  in both 1994  and 1995,  Denmark  and Finland  were downgraded  in
1992,  Japan  was downgraded  in 1998,  New  Zealand  was downgraded  in 1998,  Sweden  was downgraded  in
1991,  1993  and 1995.
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5.2  The case of banks
In  order to  highlight the difference between bank  and  non-bank ratings, we
replicate the previous set of estimates also for banks. Although, in a large number of
cases, bank deposit ratings are a mechanical reflection of sovereign ratings, it is useful to
verify to what extent this rule applies in equal measure to HIUCs  and NHICs. The bank
panel contains observations referring to Moody's long term bank deposits ratings for 959
banks from 57 countries. Country-wise, 73.4 per cent of the banks are based in high-
income countries holding a median rating  equal to  80.4 (or just  above Al),  which
compares with 44.5 (or just below Ba2) for rated banks in NHICs. This entails that bank
ratings are generally  higher than non-bank ones in both high-income and NHICs.
Table  7  reports  the  results  for  the  same  five  specifications  of  the  panel
regression' 6 used for non-banks.  The results of the first specification show that rating
changes for bank i at time t are negatively related to the rating of bank i  at time t-1
(RATING(T-1));  they are strongly positively related to sovereign rating changes at time t
(ASOVEREIGN)  and they also depend positively on the level of sovereign ratings at time
t-1  (SOVEREIGN(T-1)).1 7 As  in  the non-bank panel,  the negative  and  significant
coefficient of  the dummy  for NHICs (NONHINCM DUMMY) suggests that rating
changes are generally smaller in  their absolute size-but  not  necessarily in  relative
terms-in  these countries.
Similar to the results obtained for non-banks, the second specification adds the
new variable NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN,  in  order to  check whether sensitivity to
sovereign rating changes is larger for banks in NHICs. Results are interesting. Although
ASOVEREIGN is  still  significant, its  coefficient drops  from  0.80  to  0.28,  while
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  is significant and exhibits a large coefficient (0.65).  This
implies that bank rating changes are sensitive to sovereign rating changes in both high
and NHICs but the sensitivity in the former countries is much smaller than in the latter
countries (0.28 against 0.93).
In full conformity with the non-bank panel, the third specification includes the
additional variable NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOWNSOV,  i.e. the variable singling
out only sovereign downgradings for NHICs.  Although the results differ with respect to
the  non-bank panel,  in  qualitative terms they  point  to  the  same  direction.  First,
ASOVEREIGN  is still significant, and its coefficient doesn't change substantially with
respect  to  the  second  specification  (0.27  instead  of  0.28).  Second,
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  is still significant  too but its coefficient drops from 0.65 to
0.48. Third, NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOWNSOV  is significant and its coefficient
16  Specifically,  we consider the year-minimum  rating for the banks of the following  57 countries:
Argentina, Australia,  Austria, Belgium,  Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland,  India,  Indonesia,
Ireland,  Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  Korea, Lebanon,  Luxembourg,  Malaysia,  Malta, Mauritius,
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Tunisia,  Turkey,  UK,  USA.
17  As noted above, here we can identify a long-term relation between bank and sovereign ratings, which is
equal to 1 in the first specification,  to 0.83 in the second, and to 0.67 in the third.
Ferr,  Liu, and Majnoni,  "The Role  ofRating  Agency  Assessments  in Less Developed Countries: Impact of the Proposed  Basel  Guidelines13
is sizable (0.21).  Finally, equations (4) and (5) replicate the above specifications for
high-income  countries as well.
These results may be  interpreted as follows. Bank ratings  are a  function of
sovereign ratings both in high and in NHICs. Nevertheless, ratings of NHICs'  banks
exhibit higher short term sensitivity to  changes in  their sovereign ratings, and such
sensitivity is noticeably asymrmetric:  namely, it is larger for sovereign downgradings  than
for sovereign upgradings. In practice, a  10-point--or two notches-sovereign  rating
change translates into a 2.7 point rating change for high-income countries' banks and into
a 7.5 point rating change for NHICs'  banks. In addition, a  10-point sovereign rating
downgrading  would imply a 9.6 point downgrading for NHICs' banks, as opposed to 5.6
point for HICs.
While the observed clynamics  of rating changes may be  the hardly avoidable
consequence of the informational constraints with which rating agencies are confronted
in their activity, we claim that it is important to avoid that such dynamics could induce
undesired pro-cyclical patterns on bank capital requirements. More so when this feature
may be a peculiar feature of less developed economies.
6. The simulated impact on the CARs of crisis countries
Using the coefficients estimated above, it is possible to offer an appraisal of how
national banking systems would be  affected by  sovereign downgradings, should the
newly proposed weights apply. It would be presumptuous to claim that our simulations
provide a precise estimation of the impact of sovereign downgradings on the availability
and the cost of capital in the countries we analyze.  Sovereign downgradings, in fact,
happen along with significant changes in the way countries are perceived by markets and
there may be several channels through which such changes affect international investors'
attitudes towards affected countries.  Nevertheless, we deem it illustrative to present
some simulations based on the application of our previous findings to actual cases of
sovereign downgradings  materialized in recent years.
The approach we adopt runs as follows. First, we identify a numnber  of countries,
which experienced a sovereign downgrading in recent years.  These include six NHICs
(Brazil, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico) for both the bank and the non-
bank simulation,  together with five high-income  countries (Canada, Finland, Japan, New
Zealand, and Sweden) for  the non-bank simulation and  four high-income countries
(Finland, Italy, Japan, and Sweden) for the bank simulation.  Second, we define two
different simulations based on the estimated impact of the sovereign downgrading on
banks and on  non-banks.  The spirit of the  former simulation is  that, due  to  their
sensitivity to sovereign rating changes, the country's banks will also be downgraded. In
turn, when this implies a higher weighting of interbank exposures vis-a-vis these banks,
other domestic or international  banks lending to them will have to step up their CARs and
the downgraded country's banks will likely experience a worsening in the availability
and/or cost  of  interbank credit.  The second simulation assesses  how the  affected
country's  bank  CARs  would  change  with  the  sovereign  downgrading  under  the
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hypothesis that domestic banks were lending just to the domestic non-bank corporations
for which we observe a rating in the pre-crisis year. 18
In practice, we use the estimated values of the coefficients linking sovereign
downgradings  to bank and non-bank downgradings-respectively from Tables 6 and 7-
separately for high-income and NHICs.  We then multiply these values by the entity of
the observed sovereign downgrading.  The resulting downgrading is applied to the pre-
crisis individual bank  and non-bank ratings in  the affected country.  Depending on
whether or not this implied downgrading leads to a change of CAR weight class for some
of the domestic rated banks or non-banks, implied CARs will increase or stay the same.
Of course, given the size of the estimated coefficients, our a priori is that implied CARs
will more likely increase in NHICs.
The results of the bank downgrading simulation are shown in Figures 7A and 7B,
depicting,  respectively, the case for non-high-income  and high-income countries; Figure
7A shows that interbank CARs would have stayed constant at 8 per cent in the case of the
three downgradings-each  by  two  notches, or  10 points  in  the  numeric  scale-of
Colombia, India, and Mexico.  On the contrary, interbank CARs would have increased
substantially  in the two-notch downgrading of Brazil (from 8 to 12 per cent), in the four-
notch  downgrading  of  Malaysia  (from  1.6  to  4  per  cent),  and  in  the  six-notch
downgrading  of Korea (from 2.8 to 7.3 per cent). Figure 7B detects no change for any of
the high-income  downgradings:  interbank CARs stay put at 1.6 per cent in all four cases.
Figures  8A  and  SB-respectively  for  non-high-income  and  high-income
countries-depict  how non-bank downgradings would have affected domestic banks'
CARs.  Contrary to the case of the interbank CARs, in this simulation domestic bank
CARs increase also for most high-income  countries: they remain constant at 1.8 per cent
in the downgrade of New Zealand,  but they increase from 3.3 to 3.8 per cent for Canada,
from 2.4 to 3.2 per cent for Finland, from 3.7 to 4.1 per cent for Japan, and from 2.8 to
3.1 per cent for Sweden (Figure 8B). Nevertheless, even in this case, CAR increases are
by far more pronounced for NHICs (Figure 8A).  The only exception is Mexico, whose
bank CARs increase form 7.3 to 8 per cent.  Brazil increases from 7.4 to 8.9 per cent;
Colombia from 7 to 10 per cent; India and Malaysia double,  respectively, from 4 to 8 per
cent and from 1.6 to 4 per cent; Korea triples from 1.9 to 5.7 per cent.
All in all, these illustrative simulations may offer a simple device to assess the
impact on bank capital requirements of different regulatory schemes, without using the
individual ratings but simply making use of the observed patterns of sovereign ratings
and of the level of national income. In addition, given the limited number of available
individual ratings for NHICs, we can provide estimates of the impact which could be
expected from the perspective increase in the number of rated entities. In our case we
have shown that a sovereign downgrading has little or no impact at all for bank CARs in
high-income countries, whereas it induces ample swings for bank CARs in NHICs 19. In
turn, this implies that the new Basel proposal would exacerbate the volatility of bank
18 In order to simplify  our computations,  we make the further  assumption  that domestic  bank loans  are
uniformly  distributed  among  these  rated  corporations.
19  For  the case  at hand  the same  result  could  have  been  obtained  - with  a loss of generality  - computing  the
observed  changes  of individual  ratings  for every  single  country.
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CARs in emerging economies. Considering the direct impact of increased bank CARs
and the additional  institutional feature that emerging economies' banks would need to tap
less developed financial  markets to raise the needed capital, the new Basel proposal could
considerably  worsen the availability  and cost of credit to these countries' private sector.
In turn, even a temporary worsening in their access to bank credit could have a
negative impact on corporate sectors in emerging economies-e.g.  amplifying corporate
bankruptcies and holding corporate production constrained below potential.  This would
provoke a depletion of orgaiiizational  capacity in emerging economies' corporate sectors
with  potential long-lasting (letrimental consequences for  these  economies'  recovery
Greenwald  and Stiglitz (1993).
7. Conclusions
In this paper historical data on sovereigns and individual borrowers ratings are
used to examine what would be the effect on less developed countries of the introduction
of a link between bank Capital Asset Requirements  and external ratings, as contemplated
in the new Basel proposal.
We find that the Base.l  proposal would increase the volatility of capital needs of
banks in NHICs versus high-income countries' banks. In fact, bank and corporate ratings
in NHICs appear to be strongly related and in an asymmetric  way to changes in sovereign
ratings. A sovereign downgrading would, for instance, imply larger changes in capital
allocations than an upgrading and would call for larger capital requirements at the very
time in which access to  capital markets is more difficult. In addition, the lack of a
widespread use of ratings for banks and corporations in NHICs would not provide an
effective incentive to adopt nmore  sound risk assessments on the part of banks. In fact,
while good banks in HICs would see their capital requirements  reduced as a consequence
of a prudent lending behavior, their peers in NHICs would not draw an equivalent benefit
from an analogous attitude.
As  a result of these empirical findings, especially in the case of NHICs, we
encourage the adoption of an integrated approach, in which the use of rating agencies'
assessments for the definition of capital requirements is supplemented by a larger set of
regulatory tools.
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Table 1: Moody's and S&P alphanumeric ratings conversion into numeric values
MOODY'S  S&P  NUMERIC EQUIVALENT
Aaa  AAA  100
Aal  AA+  95
Aa2  AA  90
Aa3  AA-  85
Al  A+  80
A2  A  75
A3  A-  70
Baal  BBB+  65
Baa2  BBB  60
Baa3  BBB-  55
Bal  BB+  50
Ba2  BB  45
Ba3  BB-  40
Bi  B+  35
B2  B  30
B3  B-  25
Caal  From CCC+  to CCC-  20
Caa2  CC  15
Caa3  C  10
Caa  D  5
Table 2: S&P's scope of coverage and median rating by income category groups')
Number  of ratedfirms  Median  grade
Banks  Non Banks  Banks  Non Banks
GIO  478  3712  80  60
HighIncomenonG10  131  343  75  70
Upper Middle Income  104  196  45  45
Low Middle Income  91  82  45  35
l) Figures refer to S&P scope of coverage and ratings based on the  November 1999 CD Rom.
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Table 3: The newly proposed weights for bank capital  asset requirements
Rating Level  Proposed Risk Weight
Interbank Loans
S&P  Moody's  Moody's  Sovereign  Option  I (1)  Option  11(2) (3)  Corporate
numeric
AAA to AA-  Aaa to Aa3  100 >= R>=85  0%  20%  20%  20%
A+ to A-  Al  to A3  85> R >=70  20%  50%  20%  20%
BBB+ to BBB-  Baal to Bal  70> R>=50  50%  100%  50%  50%
BB+ to B-  Bal to B3  50>R>=25  100%  100%  100%  100%
Below B-  BelowB3  25>R  150%  150%  150%  150%
Unrated  Unrated  100%  100%  100%  100%
1988 Accord  OECD  0%  20%  20%  100%
Non-OECD  100%  100%  20% (4)  100%
(1)  Risk weighting  based on the weighting of the sovereign of the country  in which the bank is incorporated
(2)  Risk weighting based on assessment of individual  bank, which is assumed here to be the highest possible.
The risk weight is 50% for unrated banks unless capped by the sovereign rate.
(3)  For short-term  claims the risk weight of the individual  bank is one category more favorable.
The proposed  accord defines short-term  as six months maximum.
(4)  Short-term  loans. The 1988  Accord defines short-term  as one year maximum.
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Table 4: Description of the 1999 bank and non-bank samples with median ratings')
Number  (&  %) of ratedfirms  Median  grade  Sovereign
Banks  Non Banks  Banks  Non Banks  Rating
Australia  11  (1.1%)  36  (4.0%)  77  75  95
Austria  7  (0.7%)  4  (0.4%)  86  80  100
Belgium  7  (0.7%)  7  (0.8%)  85  80  95
Canada  10  (1.0%)  99  (11.0%)  85  60  92.5
Denmark  4  (0.4%)  3  (0.3%)  80  85  97.5
Finland  6  (0.6%)  8  (0.9%)  78  62.5  100
France  88  (9.2%)  31  (3.4%)  84  70  100
Germany  38  (4.0%)  13  (1.5%)  92  80  100
Greece  9  (0.9%)  5  (0.6%)  61  35  75
Iceland  2  (0.2%)  n. a.  70  n. a.  92.5
Ireland  7  (0.7%)  4  (0.4%)  79  20  100
Italy  27  (2.8%)  n. a.  76  n. a.  85
Japan  59  (6.2%)  138  (15.3%)  72  60  95
Luxembourg  6  (0.6%)  6  (0.7%)  85  75  100
Netherlands  8  (0.8%)  108  (12.0%)  93  70  100
New Zealand  n. a.  10  (1.1%)  n. a.  90  95
Norway  4  (0.4%)  8  (0.8%)  73  90  100
Portugal  5  (0.5%)  2  (0.2%)  72  92.5  90
Singapore  6  (0.6%)  6  (0.7%)  80  72.5  97.5
Spain  21  (2.2%)  6  (0.7%)  83  80  90
Sweden  8  (0.8%)  15  (1.7%)  83  70  92.5
Switzerland  9  (0.9%)  7  (0.7%)  91  90  100
UK  27  (2.8%)  140  (15.5%)  84  70  100
USA  335  (34.9%)  106  (11.7%)  80  65  100
Total high-income countries  704  (73.4%)  762  (85.0%)  80.4  65  100
Argentina  13  (1.4%)  27  (3.0%)  36  40  40
Brazil  28  (2.9%)  14  (1.6%)  25  30  25
Chile  11  (1.1%)  14  (1.6%)  63  65  72.5
China  15  (1.6%)  2  (0.2%)  60  55  70
Colombia  6  (0.6%)  2  (0.2%)  47  25  52.5
Czech Republic  6  (0.6%)  1  (0.1%)  60  65  72.5
Ecuador  2  (0.2%)  n. a.  22  n. a.  25
Egypt  7  (0.7%)  n. a.  45  n. a.  57.5
Estonia  3  (0.3%)  n. a.  54  n. a.  72.5
Hungary  6  (0.6%)  n. a.  52  n. a.  65
India  8  (0.8%)  3  (0.3%)  46  45  45
Indonesia  12  (1.3%)  8  (0.8%)  30  20  25
Jordan  3  (0.3%)  n. a.  35  n. a.  40
Kazakhstan  3  (0.3%)  1  (0.  1%)  31  35  35
Korea  18  (1.9%)  8  (0.8%)  48  50  60
Lebanon  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  30  n. a.  35
Malaysia  5  (0.5%)  3  (0.3%)  59  55  55
Malta  2  (0.2%)  n. a.  72  n. a.  70
Mauridus  I  (0.1  %)  n. a.  60  n. a.  67.5
Mexico  10  (1.0%)  28  (3.1%)  40  35  52.5
Morocco  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  45  n. a.  50
Oman  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  55  n. a.  60
Pakistan  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  16  n. a.  20
Panama  3  (0.3%)  2  (0.2%)  53  42.5  50
Peru  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  32  n.  a.  47.5
Philippines  n. a.  8  (0.8%)  n. a  47.5  52.5
Poland  8  (0.8%)  1  (0.1%)  48  55  65
Romania  4  (0.4%)  n. a.  26  n.  a.  22.5
Russia  12  (1.3%)  2  (0.2%)  19  10  5
Slovak Republic  3  (0.3%)  n. a.  47  n.  a.  55
Slovenia  2  (0.2%)  n. a.  55  n.  a.  77.5
Taiwan  10  (1.0%)  n. a.  72  n.  a.  85
Thailand  10  (1.0%)  6  (0.7%)  47  50  57.5
Tunisia  8  (0.8%)  n. a.  50  n. a.  60
Turkey  16  (1.7%)  n. a.  32  n. a.  35
Venezuela  n. a.  3  (0.3%)  n. a.  30  25
Total non-high-income  countries  255  (26.6%)  133  (15.0%l/)  44.5  40  52.5
Grand Total  959  (100.0%)  895  (100.  0%)  ...  65  95
Data are derived from Moody's public database.  Ratings are converted to numeric according to the conversion scale in Table i.
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Table 5: Description of the 1999 non-bank sample by sector with median ratings'1
Number  (& Y) of  Median  grade
rated  firms
Oil  93  (10.4%)  70
Electric  116  (13.0%)  70
Telecom  83  (9.3%)  45
Water  9  (1.0%)  80
Trading, Retail & Consumers Products  37  (4.1%)  60
TV, Telephone,  Electronics  & Electrical Equipment  84  (9.4%)  65
Construction,  Real Estate, Building Materials & Cement  33  (3.7%)  55
Agriculture  4  (0.4%)  62.5
Automotive, Tires, Transports, Aerospace,  Shipping,  79  (8.8%)  70
Machinery & Mechanical Components
Metals, Mining, Shipyards,  Containers,  Steel & Railroads  55  (6.1%)  55
Hotels, Casinos, Entertainment,  Amusements,  Motion Pictures,  25  (2.8%)  45
Records, Advertising,  Media, Jewelry & Broadcasting
Restaurants, Food, Drinks, Brewery, Sugar & Tobacco  78  (8.7%)  65
Finance, Diversified  & Miscellaneous  59  (6.6%)  65
Textiles, Apparel & Shoes  10  (1.I%)  55
Chemnicals,  Plastics, Paper, Pharmaceuticals  & Drugs  89  (9.9%)  60
Health equipment,  Help Supply Services, Office Systems,  15  (1.7%)  60
Environment,  Research Development  Labs, Hospitals &
Hospital Supplies
Printing,  Publishing, Glass,  Photo & Optical Products  23  (2.6%)  60
Sovereign  Guaranteed  3  (0.3%)  85
Grand  Total  895  (100.0Y)  65
1)  Data are derived from Moody's public database. Ratings are converted to numeric according to the
conversion scale proposed in Table 1.
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Table 6: Regression results on non-banks
Equation  (1)  Equation  (2)  Equation  (3)  Equation  (4)  Equation  (5)
Dependent  variable  ABATING  ARATING  ARATING  ARATING  ARATING
Regressors
CONSTANT  (a)  1.97 (.85)  3.7 (1.7)***  3.7 (1.67)***  1.12 (.6)  1.22 (.6)
RATING(T-1)  (y)  -.03 (-3.5)*  -.03 (-3.2)*  -.03 (-4.0)*  -.03 (-3.2)*  -.03 (-3.25)*
ASOVEREIGN(3)  .45 (20.4)*  .02 (.39)  .02 (.5)  .52 (22.5)*  .52 (22.5)*
SOVEREIGN(T-1)  (o)  -.004 (4)  -.02 (1.5)  -.01 (-1.2)  -.02 (-1.5)  -.02 (-1.6)
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  .50 (8.3)*  -.14 (1.8)***
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*  .83 (12.1)*
DOWNSOV
NONHINCM  DUMMY  -1.93 (-2.8)*  -2.57  (-3.8)*  -.34 (-.5)
HINCM*ASOVEREIGN  -.50 (-8.3)*  -.52 (-6.9)*
HINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOW  .08 (.7)
NSOV
HINCM  DUMMY  2.57  (3.8)*  2.64 (3.9)*
R2  .29  .32  .40  .33  .33
LONG-TERM  EQUILIBRIUM  -.13  -.67  -.33  -.67  -.33
Note: t statistics  reported  in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate  1%, 5%, 10% statistical  significance  levels, respectively.
ARATING:  First difference  of individual  firm rating.
RATING(T-  1): Lagged  individual  firm rating.
ASOVEREIGN:  First  difference  of sovereign rating.
SOVEREIGN(T-  1); Lagged  sovereign  rating.
NONHINCM:  Non-High-Income  country  dummy.
DOWNSOV:  Sovereign  downgrading  dunmmy.
HrNCM:  High-income  country  durmmy.
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Table 7: Regression results on banks
Equation  (1)  Equation  (2)  Equation  (3)  Equation  (4)  Equation  (5)
Dependent varaible  ARATING  ARATING  ARATING  ARATING  ARATING
Regressors
CONSTANT (cx)  .87 (.46)  .51 (.75)  .67 (.97)  -1.04 (-2.6)*  -.70 (-1.8)***
RATING(T-1)  (y)  -.08 (-13.4)*  -.06 (-11.6)*  -.06 (-11.4)*  -.06 (-11.6)*  -.06 (-11.2)*
ASOVEREIGN(,B)  .80 (49.3)*  .28 (7.4)*  .27 (7.4)*  .92 (53-9)*  .92 (54.3)*
SOVEREIGN(T-1)  (6)  .08 (9.0)*  .05 (5.8)*  .04 (5.5)*  .05 (5.8)*  .04 (4.7)*
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN  .65 (15.7)*  .48 (7.7)*
NONHINCM*ASOVEREIGN*D  .21 (3.6)*
OWNSOV
NONHINCM DUMMY  -3.0 (-1.6)***  -1.5 (-4.1)*  -1.2 (-3.2)*
HINCM*ASOVEREIGN  -.64 (-15.7)*  -.76 (-16.04)*
HINCM*ASOVEREIGN*DOWN  .4 (4.7)*
soV
HINCM DUMMY  -2.38 (-1.27)  1.44 (3.9)*  1.86  (5.0)*
R 2 .41  .45  .45  .45  .46
LONG-TERM  EQUILIBRIUM  1*  .83*  .67*  .83*  .63*
-8/ y
Note: t statistics reported in parentheses. *, *  *** indicate 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.
ARATING:  First difference of individual firm rating.
RATING(T-1):  Lagged individual firm rating.
ASOVEREIGN:  First difference of sovereign rating.
SOVEREIGN(T-1);  Lagged sovereign rating.
NONHINCM:  Non-High-Income country dummy.
DOWNSOV:  Sovereign downgrading dummy.
HINCM: High-income country dummy.
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Figure 1: Relative rating distribution
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Figure 2A:  Capital adequacy ratio change for non bank loans
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Figure 6A:
THE IMPACT  OF THE RECOVERY:  1999 VS. 1998  SOVEREIGN  RATINGS
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Figure 7A:
SIMULATED  NEW  BASLE BANK CARs AGAINST  LOANS  TO RATED BANKS IN SIX
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Figure 7B:
SIMULATED  NEW  BASLE CARS AGAINST  LOANS  TO RATED BANKS IN FOUR
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Figure 8A:
SIMULATED  NEW  BASLE BANK CARs  AGAINST LOANS  TO RATED COMPANIES  IN SIX
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Figure 8B:
SIMULATED  NEW  BASLE BANK CARs AGAINST LOANS  TO RATED  COMPANIES  IN FIVE
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